Part two on the Logical Problem of the Trinity: The Logical Problem of the Trinity and social, psychological and constitution models in response to it
The Logical problem of the Trinity
Having outlined the extremes of modalism and tritheism
and laid out co-inherence as the way to avoid these extremes I will now turn to
the logical problem of the Trinity. Within the Athanasian Creed, the following
three theological theses on God as Trinity can be found:
“1- We worship God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity...
Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.’
2- So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy
Spirit is God.
3- And yet they are not three Gods, but one God”
(Molto, 2017).
The logical problem that arises from this can be
characterized in the following way:
“1 Each person of the Trinity is distinct from each of
the others.
2 Each person of the Trinity is God.
3 There is exactly one God” (Craig, 2005).
These three together have the implication that three
distinct beings are identical with one being, which is incoherent. A series of
strategies to overcome this incoherence, from the social, constitution and
psychological models of the Trinity will now be assessed.
The social model of the Trinity
The Gospels refer to the Father and the Son. Social
Trinitarians have argued this suggests an analogy to family. As a solution to
the logical problem of the Trinity they claim the three of the Trinity are one
in the same way the members that make up a family are (three individual humans
yet a single family) (McCall, 2010), (Murray and Rea, 2012),. I find this line
of thought unpersuasive - for one thing the relation between Father and Son is
more than just familial, it denotes a role which entails the other’s existence
- the Father cannot be a Father without the Son and the Son cannot be the Son
without the Father. Furthermore, any family unit one can give as an example,
contains members which are not only distinct but also separate (separate
consciousness will emotion etc) from one another; thinking of the persons of
the Trinity as separate from one another in the same way members of a family
are will lead to either latent or explicit tritheism. It also falls short in
securing unity amongst the persons of the Trinity- there are versions of
polytheism such as “the children of Chronos in Greek mythology, of whom Zeus
was the liberator, and these children included Zeus, Hera, Ares, and other
Olympian deities—all members of a divine family” (Murray and Rea,
2012) . However, one would not claim that this divine family can be thought of
as one God (McCall, 2010), (Murray and Rea, 2012)
Advancing beyond this social Trinitarians have noted other
relations amongst the three of the Trinity alongside their being a family.
Richard Swinburne has argued several relational facts secure unity within the
Trinity. They share characteristics of divinity such as omniscience,
omnipotence, omnibenevolence and omnificence. There is also the relation
between "the 'persons’ wills being necessarily harmonious, so that they never
conflict with one another and the perfect love with necessary mutual interdependence”
(Murray and Rea, 2012). Mutual dependence is taken by Swinburne to be
equivalent to co-inherence. Swinburne
therefore holds that there is one God because the community of three are so
interconnected that despite being three distinct persons they act as if they
are one entity (McCall, 2010), (Murray and Rea, 2012).
Swinburne takes it as far as to claim that there are
three- rather than only one- divine individuals. Marilyn McCord Adams has
described his thought here as follows “three numerically distinct souls of the
Divine essential kind, each instantiating the universal Divinity, each
inevitably everlasting but individuated from one another by relations of
origin” (Adams, 2006). On this perspective it is the same essence of divinity
that makes the Father, Son and Spirit all God[1] (Swinburne, 1994).
What I take to be a key issue with Swinburne’s model
is its assumption that mutual dependence is equivalent to co-inherence which is
false; co-inherence also entails the Father, Son, and Spirit inseparably and
mutually indwell each other, not just a relation of interdependence. As Bishop
Bull has said on the matter of co-inherence “the co-inherence of the Divine
Persons is indeed a very great mystery, which we ought rather religiously to
adore than curiously pry into …. It is a union which far transcends all other
unions” (Bull,1851). Swinburne’s attempt to reduce co-inherence to mere mutual
dependence, I therefore find insufficient, and as such think it is unsuccessful
in allowing one to identify as Trinitarian and Monotheist at the same time.
Stephen T Davis’s social Trinitarian approach of
recognizing co-inherence as mutual indwelling, interpenetrating and merging has
more merit, however Davis more readily recognises the Trinity is at bottom
mysterious, beyond philosophical rigour to capture in doing so (McCall, 2016).
The model also has a short falling as it relies solely on co-inherence to ward
off accusations of tritheism, however co-inherence is not the sole way that the
three of the Trinity operate- there is also the role of incorporation.
Incorporation accommodates the mutual existence, mutual indwelling, and mutual
operation in the immanent existence and in the economic activity of the three
persons of the Trinity. Incorporation therefore sees the work of the three as
inseparable to accomplish what is distinct to one person alone, the carrying
out of the divine economy via action of the three by what they are and what they do meaning that when one acts
they incorporate the operations of the other two in manifest action. This means
each can be identified with the other with no compromising of the eternal
distinction among them (Lee, 1996).
An instance of incorporation is that the second person
of the Trinity the Son was crucified and resurrected from the dead; not the
Father or the Spirit, however it is the case that the Father and Spirit were
not separate from Christ still operating in him as he was crucified. Christ
offers himself through the Spirit, entailing the Son in himself could not
accomplish his crucifixion, the Spirit one with the Son who died on the cross
with the Father and by the Spirit. The
death of Christ was not only the death of the man Jesus but the death of the
Son with the Father and by the Spirit. The scriptures testify both that the
Father and the Spirit raised the Son on the third day; however, they also
testify that the Son rose from the dead. This recognises two things: in his
humanity God raised Jesus from the dead, whereas from the consideration of him
as God we are informed, he himself rose from the dead. The crucifixion and
resurrection of Christ is therefore an operation of the entire Trinity which is
divinely incorporated (Lee,1990), the co-inherence and incorporation of the
Trinity far beyond the ability of these models to capture.
Swinburne’s model also fails in capturing the oneness
in expression and function of the triune God which goes beyond mere aligning of
will or indivisibility for logical reasons between the persons’, as the
scriptures identify that one is another and the three are used interchangeably
in relation to man’s experience of God. God relates to man in a threefold
manner, not a collective entity which makes the Trinity, but the Trinity
itself, freely and gratuitously communicated. Brian Leftow has criticised
Swinburne’s model similarly on the grounds of worship as it only makes sense if directed to someone who is
aware of being addressed, however collections are not conscious so one cannot
worship Swinburne’s collective save as a way to worship its members (McCall,
2010).
It also requires a commitment to the belief that the
Son exists in the same way that creatures exist- only due to the Father
conserving him in being and not ending him. This is because Swinburne views
each person of the Trinity as a discrete substance (distinct being) even when
he sees the Son as casually dependent on the Father. Moreland and Craig note
that as the Son is viewed as a distinct substance from the Father, the Father’s
begetting the Son therefore amounts to a creation ex nihilo, which as Arius
claimed makes the Son a creature (Craig and Moreland,2003). This is wholly
inadequate as in the Gospel of John the relationship between the Son and the
Father can be seen. For example, in John 1:14 “the only Begotten from the
Father”—the Greek word for “from” is παρὰ (para), which means by the side of,
implying with hence, it is, literally, from with (Strong, 1890). This means
that the Son not only is from God but also is with God. On the one hand, he is
from God, and on the other hand, he is still with God. This is contrary to
Swinburne’s understanding of the Son existing due to the Father conserving him
and not ending him.
As for the unity of will among the three divine
persons on this model, this does not support Trinitarianism for three separate
Gods who were each omnipotent and morally perfect would similarly act
cooperatively, so Swinburne’s reasoning can lead one to conclude tritheism just
as easily as Trinitarianism (Craig and Moreland, 2003). Swinburne may
respond to this critique, that this
concern is dealt with by the Farther being the source of the other persons
ensuring a guaranteed coordination in their wills, whereas if they were three Gods
there could be two equally optimal, mutually exclusive ways of proceeding,
wherein one God might will one way, while another differently. My concern with
this response is that until a specific example can be given, or possible world
constructed wherein this takes place, such a possibility must be disregarded
and therefore one has to assume the God’s having the same nature and attributes
would lead to them acting cooperatively. Craig and Moreland even go as far as
to claim that if Swinburne’s arguments against the possibility of dissension
are correct this must be so (Craig and Moreland, 2003).
Other social Trinitarians have given accounts of how
the three of the Trinity are one. The part–whole model[2].is such a one, and C.S.
Lewis's uses an analogy of God being three in one and one in three in the same
way a cube is six squares yet one cube (Murray and Rea, 2012). J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig use the
analogy of the three beings that compose Cerberus, a mythical guardian of the
underworld. “Each of the three heads —or each of the three souls associated
with the heads—is a fully canine individual, and yet there is only one being,
Cerberus, with the full canine nature- three persons of a type, and still one
dog” (McCall,2010), (Murray and Rea, 2012).
There are two main issues with this approach: first,
like with Swinburne and Davis’s accounts it does not get one to the
co-inherence, incorporation and oneness in expression and function of the
triune God as a whole that is needed amongst the divine persons to avoid the
extremes of modalism and tritheism. More significantly it would lead one to
think that there were three essences in the one common essence of the Godhead
as was with the teaching of Johannes Philoponus[3],
leading to latent or explicit tritheism.
Lewis’s cube example is also problematic- for one thing a cube is a
seventh thing in addition to its six sides, but God cannot be thought of as a
fourth thing in addition to his triune nature (Murray and Rea, 2012).
The Psychological Model
Looking to the human mind or “psyche” has also been
sought to help understand the doctrine of the Trinity. Augustine proposed that
the oneness and threeness of the Godhead is like the oneness and threeness of
the human self. Augustine claimed the oneness of the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit is like the oneness of the mind (thoughts), heart (emotions) and will of
a person. Augustine therefore holds we cannot have intellectual insight of the
Trinity directly and that the created human mind which is made “in the image
and likeness of God” as seen in Genesis 1:26–28, is a reflection of the
Trinity. More extensively the mind is seen as somehow corresponding to the
Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the following ways:
“lover, loved object, the lover's love for that object
the mind, its knowledge, its love
the mind's remembering itself, understanding itself,
and willing itself
memory, understanding, and will
the mind's remembering God, understanding God, and
willing God
existing, knowing that one exists, loving the fact
that one exists” (Tuggy 2016).
These are taken to be pictures of the Trinity, the
last three being more accurate, however when it comes to representing God
Augustine holds them to be “immeasurably inadequate” (Tuggy 2016).
There is a major problem with Augustine’s line of
thought- the Father, Son and Spirit are three distinct persons, not three
distinct aspects of one person. The mind, heart and will are three aspects of
the human soul, the three of the Trinity are distinct yet inseparable, the same
yet different.
As Adolf Harnack, has said on the matter, “we can see
that Augustine only gets beyond modalism by the mere assertion that he does not
wish to be a modalist, and by the aid of ingenious distinctions between
different ideas” (Harnack,1976). Furthermore, Harnack draws attention to the
fact Augustine held the view that the Godhead is personal and is consequently
one person, being unable to overcome the contradiction in affirming the three
persons in one essence at the same time (Harnack,1976).
Thomas V. Morris argues for an analogy with the
Trinity in multiple personality disorder. Humans can have multiple
personalities so the thought is that God can also be one yet exist in three
persons. Others claim that the separate spheres of consciousness which derive
from commissurotomy offer an analogy. This involves the cutting of the corpus
callosum which is the way the two hemispheres of the brain communicate. Those
who undergo the surgery under certain conditions, demonstrate characteristics
which suggest they have two distinct spheres of consciousness which relate with
the two hemispheres of their brain. This
analogy is used to demonstrate that just as a single human can have two
distinct spheres of consciousness, God too can be three persons in one each of
which is a distinct sphere of consciousness (Murray and Rea, 2012).
What merit there is in being able to present real-life
cases to help solve the logical problem of the Trinity must be dismissed as
this understanding will lead to either latent or explicit modalism. In both
examples given there is multiple personalities or spheres of consciousness within
one person, but these personalities and spheres are not co-existent, rather
they are mere manifestations. With multiple personality disorder the different
personalities are all temporary, each one ending as a different one emerges,
and with the distinct spheres of consciousness they only emerge temporarily
under certain experimental conditions. This would lead us to understand the
Trinity as merely three successive manifestations of God, which is modalism[4], the co-existence, and
co-inherence of the divine persons in one another required for the Trinity not
being met with this model. Another interpretation is that each of the
hemispheres sustains its own stream of consciousness, co-existing with one
another. This would lead to latent or explicit tritheism as the consciousness
would be separate from one another, despite being grounded in one person,
whereas the persons of the Trinity are inseparable yet distinct.
The Constitution Model
Another solution proposed is that of relative
sameness. This claims that “things can be the same relative to one kind of
thing, but distinct relative to another. More formally:
"Relative Sameness: It is possible that there are x, y,
F, and G such that x is an F, y is an F, x is a G, y is a G, x is the same F as
y, but x is not the same G as y” (Murray and Rea, 2012).
If true one could say that the Father, Son and Spirit
are one God but distinct persons. Advocates have suggested that “reflection on
cases of material constitution for example statues and the lumps of matter that
constitute them, help us see how two things can be the same material object but
otherwise different entities” (Murray and Rea, 2012). If
true one can utilise this to see how the Father, Son and Spirit are one God yet
three distinct persons (Murray and Rea, 2012).
The common example is the Bronze statue The Thinker.
It is a single material object, yet is also a statue, meaning it can be
described as both a statue and a lump of bronze which are two distinct things. “For
example, if the statue were melted down, we would no longer have both a lump
and a statue: the lump would remain though in a different shape, but Rodin's
Thinker would no longer exist” (Murray and Rea, 2012). This suggests an intuition that the lump is
distinct from the statue, as they do not have to coexist. It is therefore
possible that two distinct things are within the same region of space-time at
the same time. This is used as an analogy to the Trinity as the Father, Son and
Spirit are taken to be one God but distinct persons the same way “a statue
and its constitutive lump are the same material object but different
form-matter compounds” (Murray and Rea, 2012).
As Daniel Molto has concluded in his defence of a
logic of strong relative identity, there has to be a utilization of logic “in
which absolute, universally reflexive, identity does not occur as a primitive
and cannot be introduced by definition” (Molto, 2017). This leads
to a rejection of “the relation of identity, and in particular giving up
Leibniz’s Law. It is also necessary to give up on any semantic account, which
attaches absolutely individuated values to terms. This means giving up the
possibility of genuine singular reference” (Molto, 2017).
“The fundamental problem with the appeal to relative identity, however, is that relative identity is widely seen as problematic” (Craig and Moreland, 2003). For one thing one cannot give an example “other than the Trinity where allegedly relative identities cannot be analysed in terms of classical identity" (Craig and Moreland, 2003). With the example of the Thinker statue there is not an identity statement at all, for the Thinker is not literally a lump of Bronze rather it has a property of bronze. It is also the case that the lump of bronze is more fundamental than the statue, persisting whatever shape the bronze assumes whereas the statue will not. This entails that the statue is a manifestation of one kind of the underlying reality, hence the example is inadequate for providing a model of the Trinity. Furthermore, “suppose that two things x and y could be the same N but could not be the same P. In this case x could not fail to be the same P as x itself, but y could. Therefore, x and y are discernible meaning they cannot be the same thing. This means that they cannot be the same N, since they cannot be the same anything- identity must therefore be absolute” (Craig and Moreland, 2003).
Theologically there are issues too as it commits one
to a part-whole relation (also problematic for Lewis’s social Trinitarianism)
within the Trinity wherein no one person is identical to the whole Trinity
(Craig and Moreland, 2003). This therefore entails the claim that no one person
of the Trinity is fully God. As already presented though co-inherence and
incorporation entail just this claim and give explanation for scriptures
identifying each person as the other. This gives the basis for the Eleventh
Council of Toledo affirming ‘‘Each single person is wholly God in Himself,’’
the Athanasian Creed ‘‘to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and
Lord,’’ and the Fourth Lateran Council that ‘‘each of the Persons is that
reality, viz., that divine substance, essence, or nature . . . what the Father
is, this very same reality is also the Son, this the Holy Spirit” (Craig and
Moreland, 2003).
A key example from the scriptures is Colossians 2:9 which says “in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily” indicating the Son is therefore the fullness of the Godhead (God himself), the fullness here denoting God’s very essence, which is his substance. This refers not just to the entirety of the triune God, but all that the triune God “is, has, does, knows, can do, has done, has obtained, has accomplished, and has attained” (Lee, 1987). As the divine Trinity is the fullness of the Godhead this makes Christ the mystery of God (Lee 1983), confirmed in Colossians 2:2 which says, "The mystery of God, Christ". He is the mystery of the Word of God in eternity past as seen in John 1:1 which says, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God”. This word of God became flesh, divinity and humanity joined to form a God-man, the mysterious divinity being brought into humanity, the mysterious fullness of the Godhead which dwells bodily in this mysterious God-man (Lee,1963) being far beyond the comprehension of human reason, and ability of a philosophical model to capture.
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